Esta investigación, realizada con 62 estudiantes del grado en Educación Infantil de la Universidad de Granada, se centra en un proyecto de contrapublicidad en el que se aúna el análisis y el sentido crítico con la capacidad creativa y expresiva, a través de la reinterpretación de campañas de publicidad infantil. Tanto los registros de observación participante, como el análisis de las imágenes, permiten afirmar que la publicidad es un marco de trabajo idóneo en el espacio interdisciplinar de Educación Artística y (...) Mediática, evidenciando preocupaciones de los futuros docentes, como la salud, la igualdad de género o la educación en valores. (shrink)

In recent years, character traits in general and virtue-related concepts in particular have been of considerable interest to philosophers, psychological researchers, and practitioners in the business ethics field. Three approaches to character traits can be used to incorporate ethics into organizations: virtues, character strengths, and competencies. The aim of this article is to clarify the concept of character traits, or virtues, and provide a unified operational version of it for incorporation into management. To this end, we first discuss the analogy (...) among virtues, character strengths, and competencies. Then, we propose a list of moral competencies that can be implemented in competency-based human resource management. (shrink)

Current frameworks on ethical decision-making process have some limitations. This paper argues that the consideration of moral competencies, understood as moral virtues in the workplace, can enhance our understanding of why moral character contributes to ethical decision-making. After discussing the universal nature of four moral competencies (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), we analyse their influence on the various stages of the ethical decision-making process. We conclude by considering the managerial implications of our findings and proposing further research.

Studies demonstrating the benefits of ethical behavior at an individual level are scarce. The business ethics literature centers its analysis on unethical behaviors and their consequences, rather than ethical behaviors and their benefits. There is now considerable debate on the role of auditors in society and the function of accounting firms in the free market capitalist system. Specifically, the eminently ethical nature of the auditor’s work has been highlighted. Therefore, the aim of our paper is to show the impact of (...) auditors’ sustained ethical behavior: the trust it generates. This trust results in considerable benefits for the firm due to a reduction in the costs of the partner’s supervision of the auditor. The methodology chosen to validate these claims is a survey of partner of the audit firm in auditing companies. The results of this research confirm the hypotheses raised in the theoretical model. (shrink)

Current suggestions for capacities that should be targeted for moral enhancement has centered on traits like empathy, fairness or aggression. The literature, however, lacks a proper model for understanding the interplay and complexity of moral capacities, which limits the practicability of proposed interventions. In this paper, I integrate some existing knowledge on the nature of human moral behavior and present a formal model of prosocial motivation. The model provides two important results regarding the most friction-free route to moral enhancement. First, (...) we should consider decreasing self-interested motivation rather than increasing prosociality directly. Second, this should be complemented with cognitive enhancement. These suggestions are tested against existing and emerging evidence on cognitive capacity, mindfulness meditation and the effects of psychedelic drugs and are found to have sufficient grounding for further theoretical and empirical exploration. Furthermore, moral effects of the latter two are hypothesized to result from a diminished sense of self with subsequent reductions in self-interest. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza el curso que Michel Foucault dictó en 1973 en el Collège de France titulado La sociedad punitiva. Mediante una reconstrucción conceptual y contextual del curso trataremos de evidenciar su deuda con la perspectiva marxista. Esta deuda da forma a un análisis que atiende a la especificidad de las relaciones de poder, pero –en consonancia con el planteamiento de buena parte de los movimientos radicales y contraculturales de la época– las vincula con el desarrollo de la sociedad (...) capitalista. Crítica de la economía política, genealogía de la moral y análisis del poder constituyen, así, los tres ejes desde los que se propone una historia de la sociedad disciplinaria sensiblemente diferente de la que el propio Foucault ofrecerá solo dos años después en Vigilar y castigar. De este modo, el curso de 1973 evidencia el fundamento marxista de las investigaciones que Foucault desarrolla en la primera mitad de la década de los setenta y cuyo abandono impactará enormemente en su obra alrededor del gobierno y el cuidado de sí. (shrink)

Collaborative economy emerged as a response to the need of people to exchange, produce and share in a more humane and cooperative manner. However, the growth of collaborative economy organizations and the terminological confusion have led to debates about their possible effects, both positive and negative. In this study, we have created a guideline that can be used to evaluate the contribution of organizations considered within collaborative economy to common good. We used the conceptualization of common good, which, from its (...) Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy, was developed by the personalist-humanist perspective of management. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the evaluation of the contribution of any organization to the common good must take into account how the participants develop their virtues, the creation of the community and its impact on the common good of society. At the end of the article, we present the aspects that society must take into account regarding collaborative economy. Firstly, society, in general, must approach collaborative economy as a tool that must complement others in the search for solutions to economic and social problems and, secondly, the governance of the platform-network is essential to foster organizational models that favour the common good. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral (...) naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing. (shrink)

The paper presents a critical appraisal of Floridi’s metaphysical foundation of information ecology. It highlights some of the issues raised by Floridi with regard to the axiological status of the objects in the “infosphere,” the moral status of artificial agents, and Floridi’s foundation of information ethics as information ecology. I further criticise the ontological conception of value as a first order category. I suggest that a weakening of Floridi’s demiurgic information ecology is needed in order not to forget the limitations (...) of human actors and/or of their surrogates, digital agents. I plea for a rational theoretical and practical view of such agents beyond utopian reasoning with regard to their potential moral status. (shrink)

Non-naturalists about the normative face the problem of providing a metaphysical explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Recently, Gideon Rosen has argued that non-naturalists can side-step this problem by rejecting strong supervenience and the view that normative truths are metaphysically necessary. Rosen proposes to take normative truths to be normatively necessary, where normative necessity is different from and irreducible to metaphysical necessity. I argue that if Rosen is right, that creates a deeper problem for robust ethical (...) realism (the view that there are mind-independent, non-natural moral facts). According to robust ethical realism, it is a normative fact that persons are an especially valuable kind of being. But if Rosen is right, that is a metaphysically contingent fact. The existence of persons is also contingent. According to robust ethical realism, then, there is a striking match between what the normative facts happen to be and the kinds of beings that happen to exist. Persons could have failed to exist and they could have failed to be valuable, but it just so happens to be a fact about the natural world that they exist and a normative fact that they have value. Given that this match is accidental, it amounts to a miraculous coincidence. To the extent that commitment to unexplained coincidences counts against a view, robust ethical realism faces a problem. (shrink)

It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: If (...) moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the still undetected error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Ethical leaders can influence followers’ ethical behaviors by establishing an ethical climate. However, followers’ responses to an ethical climate may also differ according to the amount of attention they devote to moral questions. This study analyzes whether moral attentiveness augments the positive effect of an ethical climate on employees’ ethical behaviors, as well as the indirect effect of ethical leadership on employee ethical behavior through an ethical climate. Data from 270 employees in the Malaysian manufacturing industry indicate that the (...) positive impact of an ethical climate on ethical behavior is greater among employees who exhibit high rather than low moral attentiveness; this moderating role also applies to the relationship between ethical leadership and employee ethical behavior through the ethical climate. This study thus sheds new light on the notable role of moral attentiveness in ensuring that ethical leadership and ethical climate enhance ethical behavior in the workplace. (shrink)

En este artículo se pretende explicar las líneas generales de la obra filosófica de Germain G. Grisez desde el primer principio de la razón práctica de Santo Tomás hasta la construcción de los bienes básicos. Grisez, a través de sus artículos, intenta una lectura radical de Santo Tomás y pretende mostrar que la inclinación teleológica aristotélica puede ser también entendida deontológicamente, siguiendo la obra de Kant, y que el primer principio de la razón práctica permite que la ley natural proteja (...) toda una serie de bienes en los que se manifiesta el bien supremo que es Dios. Entre los bienes básicos, se estudia con mayor detenimiento el de la religión, mostrando diferencias y semejanzas con la obra de Kant.This article intends to explain the broad lines German G. Grisez’s philosophical work from the first principle of practical reason of St Thomas to the construction of basic goods. Grisez through his articles attempts a radical reading of St Thomas and aims to show that theological Aristotelian inclination can be also understood in a deontological way following the work of Kant and, that the first principle of practical reason allows natural law to protect a range of goods in which God, the supreme good, is shown. Among the basic goods, religion is thoroughly studied, showing differences and similarities with the work of Kant. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta mostrar los comienzos de la filosofía jurídica de Alasdair MacIntyre antes de la publicación de After Virtue. MacIntyre sostiene que en las sociedades liberales la regulación es un sustituto para la moralidad cuando las sociedades no tienen fundamentos morales adecuados. Para entender esta conclusión, se examina la evolución filosófica de MacIntyre desde 1960 hasta 1980.

A major figure in New Confucianism,1 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is often considered one of the most important thinkers of twentieth-century China. His philosophical work he labeled "moral metaphysics," a caption inspired by Kant's term "moral theology," marking, at one and the same time, both an homage to and a disapproval of the German philosopher's work. In Mou's view, Kant, unable to come up with a convincing solution to the problem of integrating practical and theoretical philosophy, fails to provide a viable (...) notion of the "Highest Good".2 Mou's own proposal to emend this alleged deficiency rests on two main pillars: the concept of intellectual intuition and the figure of a "perfect teaching"... (shrink)

En su último libro, Han afirma: «[y]a no habitamos la tierra y el cielo, sino Google Earth y la nube» (p. 12). En No-cosas, Han critica el paso del mundo de las cosas hacia el mundo de las no-cosas. Las cosasson vendrían a ser los objetos físicos que solían constreñir nuestra vida cotidiana: los árboles, los libros, las casas y sus respectivos habitantes. Frente a ellas, Han nos muestra las no-cosas —o información digital—. Las no-cosas son realidades intangibles y, por (...) ende, inmunes al paso del tiempo. Los e-books o libros electrónicos, por ejemplo, son las no-cosas que en la actualidad intentan reemplazar a los libros. La naturaleza se aleja de nosotros siendo únicamente accesible mediante la pantalla de nuestros smartphones. Las personas también escapan de nuestro alcance, disponiendo únicamente de ellas en redes sociales como Facebook o Tinder (p. 94). En suma, No-cosas es una crítica social a la digitalización del mundo y una elegía al ‘misticismo’ del mundo de las cosas. (shrink)

El presente escrito argumenta que en la propuesta intuicionista desarrollada en Haidt (2001) no se distingue claramente una propuesta intuicionista de una propuesta emotivista. Esto supone un problema epistémico, pues la primera se comprende desde una perspectiva cognitivista,mientras que la segunda lo es desde una postura no cognitivista en el ámbito moral. Hay por tanto una tensión en los presupuestos de la propuesta intuicionista haidtiana, que inter alia Huemer (2005) discute desde una perspectiva racionalista moderada. Este escrito sostiene que elintuicionismo (...) no supone un compromiso con la discusión entre objetivismo y subjetivismo moral, permitiendo de este modo una aproximación que permita un diálogo fructífero entre el emotivismo, el intuicionismo y el racionalismo en el estatus epistémico del juicio moral. Ello permite abordar la arista del estatuto moral desde una posición racionalista moderada, abierta a los aportes interdisciplinares y de este modo al naturalismo no reduccionista. Este análisis permite afirmar que sí hay verdades morales, siendo el foco de discusión objetivismo-subjetivismo más bien sobre el acceso a ellas, que del cuestionamiento de su existencia. (shrink)

Abstract: It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: (...) If moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y” means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. In “Key concepts in philosophy”, Sankt Augustin 2015, institutionalism is explained further (p.184-191) and confined to what Hegel has called “Sittlichkeit” that is customary morality in in distinction to the “morality” of my personal consciousness (p.212-213):. (shrink)

As the intuitions about moral phenomenology shows the metaphysical distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent properties has set the metaethical distinction between normativity and objectivity in ethics. Traditionally, many arguments were built in order to show that moral realists cannot account, in naturalist vocabulary, for the process of determining moral reference due to the desiderative disposition taken to be necessarily part of the meaning of moral terms. This dissertation assess some anti-realists arguments like is-ought thesis, the argument from queerness, the argument (...) from relativity and the open question argument. In what follows I propose the semantics elaborated by Cornell realism in order to address these arguments, especially the open question argument. However, as Moral Twin Earth test shows us the semantic proposed by Boyd is incomplete. Therefore I also evaluate a second attempt taken by Cornell realists such as Brink and Copp, based on Putnan's notion of referential intentions. (shrink)

This is a collection of classics in moral and political philosophy containing only public domain and fair-use material. The primary role of this collection is to provide instructors, students, and researchers with a set of free materials. It unites in chronological order the most indispensible historical texts for an introduction to value theory, broadly construed. As such, the collection includes foundational works in intrinsic value theory, practical reason, normative ethics, metaethics, political theory, and political economy. It encompasses the most perennial (...) topics in political philosophy such as justifications of the right to rule (governmental authority, political legitimacy) and the duty to obey (political obligation), competing conceptions of human nature, the significance of individual liberty, the point of equality, assessments of private and common property systems, and the nature of a just distribution of goods. (shrink)

In light of social change and rapid technological improvement, "Cultural Heritage and Moral Obligations: A Philosophical Inquiry into Preservation and Innovation" sets out to investigate the ethical aspects of cultural heritage. This investigation explores the value of cultural legacy as a storehouse of human knowledge, identity, and community while recognising its enormous influence on the construction of both personal and societal narratives. It recognises the difficulties presented by the needs of development and the demands of respecting the past as it (...) makes its way through the conflict between innovation and preservation. The research study used smart PLS software and generated descriptive statistic, correlation coefficient, and the smart PLS Algorithm model between the cultural heritage and moral obligations. The research also describes the relation between preservation and innovation. Using meticulous scrutiny, it illuminates the ethical duties that are intrinsic to the conservation of cultural heritage, advocating for sophisticated comprehensions and moral structures that give precedence to inclusion, fairness, and justice. In the end, this investigation advocates for a future in which the diversity and complexity of human culture are honored, conserved, and treasured for all eternity, encouraging contemplation on our relationships with the past and our obligations to future generations. Overall, the research found that the philosophical investigation of "Cultural Heritage and Moral Obligations" provides a basis for tackling current issues and cultivating long-term strategies for cultural heritage innovation and preservation in a variety of domains and settings. Stakeholders may preserve the history of humanity for future generations and support the principles of inclusion, fairness, and justice by incorporating ethical concerns into decision-making processes. (shrink)

In The moral problem (1994), Michael Smith tries to link three conflicting theories that alone are intuitively plausible, nevertheless, they do not seem to work well together. The first proposes that moral judgments are in fact beliefs about objective matters. The second states the concept of “practicality requirement”. The third is a humean belief-desire psychology, i.e. if a moral judgment is sufficient to explain actions, then it must involve a desire. If that is the case, it cannot be simply a (...) belief. For Smith, any attempt to solve the moral problem must find a way to hold all three doctrines. I will argue that his solution rests on two false assumptions. The first, a rationalist one which supports that what we have reason to do is what we would desire to do if we were fully rational. The second is the internalist thesis about moral motivation according to which a person who believes she is morally required to do something is either necessarily motivated to do it or she is practically irrational. I will base my critics on four objections raised by Copp, Miller, Shafer-Landau, Brink and Sayre-McCord. (shrink)

¿Apolítico? ¿Revolucionario? ¿Reaccionario? Durante largo tiempo, el pensamiento político nietzscheano ha sido sometido a múltiples alteraciones que han eclipsado su singular carga emancipadora. Pero el desafío no está tanto en la respuesta como en saber formular correctamente la pregunta, pues la dureza de la crítica nietzscheana a los movimientos sociales de su época y especialmente al socialismo no viene necesariamente acompañada de una justificación del capitalismo sino de su simultánea descalificación. Partiendo de la voluntad de poder como dinámica vital fundada (...) en la desigualdad, el presente artículo se ocupa de la relación entre Nietzsche y el socialismo, tanto de las críticas recíprocas como del sentido profundo de las mismas, justipreciando así las energías de su controvertido programa político y que lo hacen digno valedor emancipatorio en el horizonte de nuestro presente. (shrink)

I present an objection to robust ethical realism, the view that there are mind-independent moral facts with normative import. I argue that if we combine robust ethical realism with a traditional conception of morality, according to which persons are especially relevant from a moral point of view, the result is that there is a remarkable coincidence between the content of normative facts and the kind of beings that actually exist. On the one hand, the normative facts single out persons as (...) anespecially relevant kind of being and, on the other hand, persons happen to exist. This match amounts to a coincidence because, according to robust ethical realism, normative facts cannot explain why there are persons and the fact that there are persons cannot explain why the normative facts are what they are. To the extent that commitment to unexplained coincidences counts against a view, robust ethical realism faces a problem. Although there are important similarities between this objection and other objections to normative realism that appeal to remarkable coincidences (such as Street’s evolutionary debunking argument and Bedke’s cosmic coincidence argument), I argue that the moral coincidence poses a different problem for robust ethical realism. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan, one of the main representatives of New Confucianism in twentieth-century China, has presented, under the designation of a moral metaphysics, an ambitious philosophical reconstruction of Confucianism drawing both on Kantian critique and Buddhist scholasticism. I have argued elsewhere that this "philosophized" Confucianism can be understood as a reformulation of the daotong, the traditional view that the correct transmission of the Confucian Way proceeds from a master to his disciples. Unlike what Mou's prominent academic standing, at least in his (...) later years, might suggest, the core of Confucianism in his view is thus transmitted not in public discourse but in an intimate communication... (shrink)

Previous research has shown positive relationships between fitness level and different cognitive abilities and academic performance. The purpose of this study was to explore the relationships between logical–mathematical intelligence and mathematical competence with physical fitness in a group of pre-adolescents. Sixty-three children from Castro del Río, aged between 11 and 12 years, participated in this research. The Superior Logical Intelligence Test and the EVAMAT 1.0–5 battery were used. Physical fitness was evaluated by the horizontal jump test, the 4×10 meter speed–agility (...) test, and the Course Navette test. The analyses showed positive relationships between physical fitness with logical–mathematical intelligence and mathematical competence. Specifically, linear regression analyzes indicated that the 4×10 speed–agility test significantly predicted mathematical competence and the horizontal jump test significantly predicted logical–mathematical intelligence. These results are in agreement with previous research, highlighting the importance of improving physical fitness from an early age due to its benefits for intellectual and academic development. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar la dificultad y los límites para comprender el significado ético de las decisiones profesionales. Éstas denotan tensiones dialécticas entre lo que el individuo considera su responsabilidad directa y las condiciones en las cuales se ve obligado a actuar y no puede controlar. En otras palabras, se cree actuar con buenas intenciones y razones legítimas y termina determinado por una cadena de acciones que lo llevan a un colapso del significado moral, tanto de sí (...) mismo y del valor del acto en sí, lo cual se convierte en un argumento para justificar la violencia de sus actos. Proponemos que la ética puede comprender estas tensiones si se toman en cuenta las problemáticas existenciales internas de la persona que decide, como son la angustia y la desesperación en conjunto con las aportaciones de las teorías del comportamiento y la comunicación organizacional. Para ello se analiza el caso de las decisiones del fraude financiero llevado a cabo por Bernard Madoff. (shrink)

Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on human autonomy of digital experiences are (...) neither straightforward nor consistent, and are complicated by commercial interests and tensions around compulsive overuse. This multi-layered reality requires an analysis that is itself multidimensional and that takes into account human experience at various levels of resolution. We borrow from HCI and psychological research to apply a model (“METUX”) that identifies six distinct spheres of technology experience. We demonstrate the value of the model for understanding human autonomy in a technology ethics context at multiple levels by applying it to the real-world case study of an AI-enhanced video recommender system. In the process we argue for the following three claims: 1) There are autonomy-related consequences to algorithms representing the interests of third parties, and they are not impartial and rational extensions of the self, as is often perceived; 2) Designing for autonomy is an ethical imperative critical to the future design of responsible AI; and 3) Autonomy-support must be analysed from at least six spheres of experience in order to approriately capture contradictory and downstream effects. (shrink)

Pretendo mostrar a relação entre o surgimento das primeiras apologias do luxo no século XVIII e a mudança de estatuto das paixões humanas. A hipótese que gostaria de defender é a de que a alteração da compreensão das paixões humanas possibilitou a formulação de uma nova antropologia segundo a qual a busca por prazer é entendida como legítima moral e politicamente.

We intend to analyze the relationship between Hans Blumenberg and Hannah Arendt around their anthropological perspectives to complement the vision of the former based on the particular way that the philosopher has of connecting with the practical and political world and, also to think about the implications that the anthropological perspective provided by Blumenberg has for practical reflection. In this sense, we focus on two themes: their reflection on the metaphor and the anthropological reading of the astronautical company. We will (...) link these topics with the development of a contempo- rary anthropology, that is to say, although it is not possible to achieve a substantialist definition of the human being, even so, the question about our own occurrence is fun- damental; in this case, the access route to anthropological doubt will be the metaphor. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to address some of the questions on the notion of agent and agency in relation to property and personhood. I argue that following the Kantian criticism of Aristotelian metaphysics, contemporary biotechnology and information and communication technologies bring about a new challenge—this time, with regard to the Kantian moral subject understood in the subject’s unique metaphysical qualities of dignity and autonomy. The concept of human dignity underlies the foundation of many democratic systems, particularly in Europe (...) as well as of international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Digital agents, artificial organisms as well as new capabilities of the human agents related to their embeddedness in digital and biotechnological environments bring about an important transformation of the human self-appraisal. A critical comparative reflection of this transformation is important because of its ethical implications. I deal first with the concept of agent within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy, which is the basis for further theories in accordance with and/or in opposition to it, particularly since modernity. In the second part of this paper, I deal with the concept of personhood in Kantian philosophy, which supersedes the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and builds the basis of a metaphysics of the moral human subject. In the third part, I discuss the question of artificial agents arising from modern biology and ICT. Blurring the difference between the human and the natural and/or artificial opens a “new space” for philosophical reflection as well as for debate in law and practical policy. (shrink)

This timely book offers a theistic approach to secular legal systems and demonstrates that these systems are neither agnostic nor atheist. Critical but succinct in its approach, this book focuses on an extensive range of liberal legal approaches to religious and moral issues, and subjects them to critical scrutiny from a secular perspective. Expertly written by a leading scholar, the author offers a rare combination of profundity of ideas and simplicity of expression. It is a ringing defense of the theistic (...) conception of secular legal systems and an uncompromising attack on the agnostic and atheist conception. (shrink)